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1. INTRODUCTION
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms have come to the fore as a logical companion
to Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). In the spirit of Mitchell (1990)
we can see IWRM as a multi-layered systems approach to water management,
integrating
1. Relations between surface and groundwater, quantity and quality
2. Relations between water and land use (environment)
3. Relations between water and stakeholder interests
4. Relations between water-related institutions
While combining these four seems a perfectly logical way forward for a
water sector in need of modernisation, they bring a surfeit of challenges, and require
a radical change in the culture of water management. After all, IWRM, notoriously
difficult to model, is not just the sum total of all the isolated facets of water management
- it requires a totally different, de-compartmentalised institutional set-up. Boundaries
between use, functions, disciplines, experts and lay people need to be torn down,
while administrative boundaries must give way to unified management at catchment
(or wetland) level. Much actual IWRM planning therefore remains at Level 2
(integrating land and water).
In the current policy discourse, however, the philosophy of involving
multiple stakeholder groups in resource management seems unstoppable. The UNCED
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World Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, kicked off the development by making express
reference to the need for policymakers to consult nine ´major groups .1 This provided
a spur for numerous Local Agenda 21 initiatives in Brazil and around the world. While
water management did not yet feature so prominently in the Rio principles, dialogue
and co-management increasingly found their way into the management of common-
pool resources (CPRs) like coastal management, fisheries and forestry - that latter
sector especially giving rise to a productive and critical literature on the topic of
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (e.g. EDWARDS & WOLLENBERG, 2002). In the water
sector, too, Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (also known as Fora, Dialogues, Partnerships
and Mesas de Concertación) as currently widely promoted as an institutional setting
for participatory water management, attract considerable support base from almost all
quarters - policymakers, donors, NGOs, water managers and water supply companies.
International donors like Canadian IDRC and Dutch SNV promote local multi-
stakeholder processes, and multilateral organisations (World Bank, Inter-American
Development Bank) push for participation to forestall conflict over infra-structural
projects - or to pick up the pieces after it (as a conditionality to secure further loans),
in the case of Cochabamba´s ´water war´ of 2000 (WARNER, 2004).
Both IWRM and MSP are ways of managing increasing degrees of variety
(diversity) and variability (dynamics) (s. KOOIMAN, 2000). This diversity of
perceptions, the argument runs, is likely to bring a multitude of overlooked aspects to
the table, which, in turn, is hoped to hold the key to more integrated and sustainable
outcomes. Once people see the sense of involving multiple voices, it is felt, they will
be broadly accepted as the way forward in dealing with the increasing complexity,
diversity and dynamics of water management.
From a functionalist perspective, MSPs are perceived as problem-solving
institutional innovations, to democratise water management, to manage conflict, even
to make water management more efficient (see WARNER, forthcoming, for an
inventory of these rationales). But what is actually going on, and how do we approach
our research and analysis? What are we actually talking about? While obviously an
increasingly popular pet, MSP as newly emerging social life form still requires proper
determination. Setting out to study Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, we are not looking
into a phenomenon with clear prior definitions. Like the elusive 'regimes', in vogue in
the 1980s in the discipline of International Relations, they are not necessarily 'things
out there', institutions with offices, bye-laws and secretariats, but inferred patterns of
behaviour and interaction, singled out of a complex reality and labelled 'MSP' because
having this class of constellations seems to add to our understanding of reality.
The present article conceptualises and typifies the multitude of organisms
that fall under the rubric of multi-stakeholder platforms. It starts by unpacking the
concept of MSPs, and the degree of power sharing they facilitate. It provides a
preliminary typology of MSPs in terms of degree of influence. The last section will
discuss the issue of in- and (self-)exclusion of actors.
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2. UNPACKING MSPS
The motives for studying a phenomenon like MSPs are multiple, and
seem to be related to different actors' social agendas.
First, multi-stakeholder dialogue is a New Thing, a novelty that did not
catch various researchers' eye - which is not to say that it had not existed before:
impelled by necessity people start to interact with groups they didn't interact with
before.
Second, these researchers are joined by those who pick the theme and
catchphrase up. They look at existing and past cases and wonder if the label doesn't
stick there, too. Aren't the venerable Dutch non-governmental water management
boards, where farmers have come together for centuries to regulate the water levels a
kind of MSPs? Aren't Zimbabwean Catchment Councils MSPs (MANZUNGU, 2001)?
This approach broadens the appeal, but at the same time runs the risk of stretching
the definition beyond its limits. MSP definitions tend to come from the prescriptive
rather than descriptive end - the ideal-type MSP is imbued with a very positive value
connotation. Because of characteristics attributed to them - diversity, democracy,
learning - MSPs are deemed a Good Thing, a model to be strived after. This leads to
conflicting definitions and classifications of what real (proper) MSPs are, an issue
Warner and Verhallen (2005) have tried to tackle elsewhere.
Third, as the label starts capturing the imagination as an attractor in a
value field, actors and institutions may start to attach the label to themselves or their
initiatives, whether or not they actually conform to the analytical definition. As a
topic becomes 'hot', it attracts all kinds of initiatives and research into everything
Mullti-Stakeholder-related.
But what actually makes a multi-stakeholder platform? A widely accepted
definition defines a platform as a 'decision-making body (voluntary or statutory)
comprising different stakeholders who perceive the same resource management problem,
realise their interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action
strategies for solving the problem' (STEINS & EDWARDS, 1998). It is like a
roundtable, where people are gathered with very different perspectives. When people
come together in platforms, they have multi-stakeholder dialogues. A multi-stakeholder
dialogue is not just a conversation, but an interactive approach to getting things done
- 'a contrived situation in which a set of more or less interdependent stakeholders in
a resource are identified and invited to meet and interact in a forum for conflict
resolution, negotiation, social learning and collective decision-making towards
concerted action' (RÖLING & WOODHILL, 2001).
The word 'Multi-Stakeholder Platforms' is a compound of three defining
elements - multi, stakeholder and platform. Out of these three, 'stakeholder' itself is
of recent vintage. In issues of corporate governance, it is increasingly realised that
apart from the (often short-term) interests of shareholders, other interests such as
employees, suppliers, the community and the environment should be taken into account
if the company is to be legitimate and sustainable. Giddens (1998), head of the London
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School of Economics and one of the auctores intellectualis of New Labour, coined the
'stakeholder society' as a way nations should be governed. Society is thus represented
as an enterprise, with all the risk-taking, profit and loss that involves, rather than a
secure living environment.
Stakeholders, then, are individuals, groups or institutions that are
concerned with, or have an interest in the water resources and their management.
They include all those who affect and/or are affected by the policies, decisions, and
actions of the system. That means not only direct water users but those affected by
(waste)water management. They include those involved in water resource
development, management and planning, including public-sector agencies, private-
sector organisations and NGOs and external (such as donor) agencies.
The 'multi' in MSP does not refer to 'multiple stakes' on the part of one
person or group (although they may well be present - as well as single stakeholders
wearing multiple hats), but to the diversity of identities of stakeholders. The 'multi' is
contrasted with 'single-sector' forms of interaction such as practiced in Participatory
Irrigation Management (PIM). PIM is nominally concerned with agriculture, not
fisheries, industry, navigation, urban water uses - although PIM may indeed seek to
represent different interests within agriculture - high-, mid- and lowland farmers, or
smallholders and latifundistas, or allocate special voice to the traditionally
disenfranchised such as landless or women.
Perhaps because of this agricultural origin, stakeholders still tend to be
solely defined in terms of economic identity groups (www.earthsummit2002.org/wausus/
mtingrports/s9/s9.htm), while in cases of multi-ethnicity or multiple language identities
or religions (Belgium, Canada, Canada, Lebanon) it would make sense to assign
stakeholdership to cultural, religious or other identities where these identities are
salient, in the tradition of 'consociationalism' , which  tries to explain how democratic
stability is possible in culturally segmented political systems. as a way of accommodating
social conflict (LIJPHART, 1969).
One key driver for participation is the salience of the water issue. When
the management challenge is immediate and urgent, such as flood risk in a threatened
area, social pressure for all to participate will be high, especially where interdependence
between social actors is obvious. In the Netherlands, to name one example where just
over half the country is below sea level, even the non-participation of a single smallholder
could upset the communal system for dike raising and maintenance. This power of
obstruction made the voice of minorities a force to be reckoned with.
In terms of number, we obviously expect more than two interests to be
represented to deserve the 'multi' prefix, but often there are more criteria. A very
rough measure of the 'multi'-inclusiveness of MSPs is whether state, civil-society, and
private-sector actors are represented. In terms of the vertical dimension, it also makes
sense for different levels of government to be represented (e.g. local government and
state government) as both impact on the catchment's management, at the strategic
and operational level. In water management, the co-ordination between these groups
often turns out disastrous (HILHORST, 2003; WARNER, HILHORST &
WAALEWIJN, 2003), most recently evidenced in the response to the hurricane Katrina
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in New Orleans. However, if this means that three minority interests at three levels
getting together equals an MSP, perhaps our thinking is on the wrong track. We have
to look at actor relevance and roles within the network comprising MSPs as well. It
depends on the local situation who the relevant stakeholders are. According to Paul
Engel (pers. comm.), relevant actors are those that 'just won't go away'. That is a very
pragmatic understanding of 'relevant' but, as we shall see, it obscures at least two
categories: the dominant ones, who may feel they have nothing to gain from participation,
and unaware actors, who do not know what there is to gain. In terms of relevance,
Gavin and Pinder (2001) usefully identify primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary
stakeholders are those who are ultimately affected, i.e. who expect to benefit from or
be adversely affected by the intervention; secondary stakeholders: those with some
intermediary role, bringing or testing knowledge or carrying mediation and facilitation
skills. Note however that even with the best of intentions, it may not be possible for
the facilitator to avoid power-play due to structural power differences making themselves
fall within and/or outside the platform.
These differences point at a lack of a 'level playing the field', which is
relevant for the third element in MSP, a 'platform', as a forum for negotiation, which
suggests a raised and level surface. Raised, to be able to step out of sectoral issues and
take a more broad overview of the issues, while the raised surface also connotes the
conspicuous nature of MSPs, which act in the public space and are therefore open to
public scrutiny. Level, in the sense that the stakeholders (ideally) have (or come to a
situation of) equal rights and power balance (DEN HOND, 2003). The assumption of
a level playing field is one of the most conspicuous flaws in MSP thinking given the
obvious power gaps, or indeed politics, between the participating actors (HEMMATI,
2002).
If not directly given a seat by the facilitators or according to the bye-laws of
the platform, non-represented interests may find their way through co-opting formally
sanctioned identities where the platform's bye-laws provide strict barriers to (later) entry.
For example, barriers to entry to the Dutch waterschappen (water management boards)
are high - it would take a statutory change to allow a seat for a new stakeholder group
- which forces environmental groups to co-opt one of the incumbent stakeholder groups.
But barriers may be more subtle: as Warner & Simpungwe (2003) have noted on the
basis of Simpungwe's experience with South African MSPs, platforms are unlikely to
remain captivating to the rural poor when the meetings are held in urban block offices
with lots of people in suits toting laptops, or when the local language is not understood.
Physical and cultural accessibility of the participatory process is therefore graded.
A second meaning of 'platform' (a raised surface) is more appealing: it
connotes the conspicuous nature of MSPs, which act in the public space and are
therefore open to public scrutiny. This is however not always in conformity with reality.
In developing policy, stakeholders may be sworn to secrecy to promote the confidentiality
for actors to start exchanging information and making deals with each other. Not
everyone respects that code, however - we found instances of leaked information, to
stakeholder constituencies or to the press.
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What's in a name? MSPs as networks
The name 'Multi-stakeholder platforms' has proved to be a mildly
controversial one. The 'stakeholder' metaphor connotes that stakes can be actively
raised or withdrawn, which many in society cannot. Some NGO speakers therefore
would prefer other neologisms such as 'stakegainers' and 'stakelosers'. We will maintain
the suggestion, implicit in the word, of getting or holding on to access to the actual
water resource or service and shall assume that actors develop intentional strategies to
do so. A stakeholder, then, is someone who has got something to lose (or win) with
respect to a scarce resource.
We also gleaned from discussions with Indian researchers that platforms
seem to have an unwelcome connotation in India, just like mesas de concertación, for
historic reasons don't always have a good ring in Latin America. Röling himself is not
much using the term he coined any more, preferring 'Multi-Stakeholder Processes'.
Fortunately our focus is wide enough to allow for multi-stakeholder
'processes','partnerships', 'dialogues', 'fora', 'roundtables' and other such beasts. In fact,
in the course of our research, we have become more and more convinced that what
we are in fact researching are networks rather than actual platforms, which suggests
physically fixed space with an organisational structure and secretariat.
Platforms and networks are both metaphors. Platforms suggest a form of
institutionalisation networks do not. Network management suggests shifting alliances,
not necessarily tied to one place, or  it could also be only a meeting of the stakeholders
where the basin's polycentric management is being discussed (cf. SCHLAGER &
BLOMQUIST, 1998). The Yakunchik platform in Ayacucho, Perú is more like a
heterarchical 'phone circle', a group of people who are in touch with each other but
do not actually have a secretariat and an office (see TYPE 1, below). Likewise the
Indian Sabermati Forum (TYPE 3) rarely meets as a platform, but functions as a
facilitating network.
In this respect the term 'Network management' has its merits. Let us
briefly look into the scholarship on the concept. A concept rising in the late 1990s
(and made famous in the academic world by the hefty tomes published by MANUEL
CASTELLS from 1996) ideally provides a middle ground between hierarchical order
and heterarchical chaos, state and market, the rigidity of the 'one best way' and
unmanageable freedom, monoculture and variety as complexity theory has it: the most
stable point for navigation is the edge of chaos. The multi-stakeholder platform
combines these elements as it allows for greater variety and flexibility than a pyramidal
organisation. Horizontal meets vertical in a structured way, as seats are allocated to
groups, but membership - entry and exit - is open.
In a network, problem-solving capacity is dispersed. Network management
is suitable in a mixed-motive situation: where actors involved are facing both cooperative
(interdependency) and confrontational stimuli. Network management in the
conception of a group of Dutch public administration scholars (e.g. KICKERT, 1993)
is seen as a form of coordination of strategies of actors with different goals with regard
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to a certain problem or policy measure within an existing framework of inter-
organizational relations. Network management takes place in a context without clear
goals, without clear management hierarchy and without clear decision procedures on
which to rely. Thus network management can be considered a 'weak' form of steering
or at least as a form of steering in which uncertainties are 'built in'.
Network management can be judged by the extent to which it enhances
the conditions for 'favourable' interaction and the degree to which the network supports
these processes. Based on the idea that networks are often characterized by co-operation
and co-ordination problems caused by the lack of a dominant decision centre, network
management is considered a success if it promotes cooperation between actors. In
multi-stakeholder platforms, power is - ideally - dispersed in such a way that no actor
dominates, and its management is not monopolised by a single actor. The degree of
structure they possess can range from highly organised to a free-ranging social group,
a kind of 'phone circle' as in 'Type 1'below.
3. NEGOTIATION OR SOCIAL LEARNING THROUGH DIALOGUE?
'Since dialogue is our only hope, it
must work' (RÖLING & WOODHILL, 2001)
Having re-conceptualised platforms as networks, let us now turn to what
MSPs are for. The writings on MSPs come from very different world views - one in
which people change things by learning together (what I call 'cognitive school'), and
one in which things only change by changing the power balance (the 'realist school').
In other words: while much of the literature concentrates on multi-stakeholder processes
for social learning, others see them primarily as spaces for negotiation. These views are
most clearly expressed in the view of cooperation and conflict.
As Glasbergen (1995) notes, networks are a logical outcome when both
collaborative and cooperative pulls are encountered. Each of the schools of thought
emphasises one of the extremes on this continuum. Aarts & van Woerkum (2000)
contrast two types of negotiation - distributive and integrative negotiation. Distributive
negotiation is antagonistic, interest-based, mainly concerns the cutting of the cake,
actors keep their cards close to their chests. A conflict framework sees negotiations as
zero-sum with winners and losers. A co-operation approach sees ´win-win´ outcomes.
It stresses the interest representation aspect and the need to redress power differences
(e.g. BOELENS, 2002). The approach is reflected in the MSP-as-alliance we shall
encounter later as ´Type 5´.
Integrative negotiation, on the other hand, starts from a commonly
perceived challenge, involves 'baking the cake together', and involves joint social
learning. On the co-operation side, the cognitive school is interested in whether joint
gains can be obtained through learning in the face of uncertainty, information gaps
and low trust. Where, say, rich white farmers and poor black smallholders in South
Africa are not talking to each other and both are wary of central government, gathering
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these interests round the table and negotiate common problems and getting them to
put themselves in each other's shoes, a joint learning process may take place. This
makes the democratic form reflected in MSPs 'deliberative' in nature rather than a
simple majority vote (WARNER & SIMPUNGWE, 2003). Just like integrated
management is a great leap forward from aspect management, learning together
constitutes a great leap forward from one-way extension of (agricultural) practices.
The ´cognitive´ strand, concerned with deliberation and learning, has
been especially fruitful in the area of agricultural extension, where it was realised
more and more that one-way communication was less and less acceptable to the targeted
groups - they had views and knowledge too with which the training on offer was not
necessarily compatible. This led to new models for two-way dialogue, soon expanded
to a multi-directional (roundtable) model. The CIS group at Wageningen University
benefited from soft-systems theory (CHECKLAND & HOLWELL, 1998) in dealing
with the complexity that arises when you want to have multiple-way deliberation
instead of one-way extension. Each stakeholder or stakeholder group can be expected
to have different interests concerning the use and management of a natural resource,
and different perceptions. However, due to the existing information gaps, rather than
just bargaining on the basis of these interests, this school feels that, given the proper
facilitative conditions, it may also be possible to get people to change their problem
definitions. In a situation of complexity, actors are advised to leave their sectorial
perspective behind to develop a shared perspective in a process of 'reframing' policy
problems (GRAY, 1997). This requires skilful facilitation - if badly done, a reframing
process can of course result in a totally expedient 'vision' with a high deal of equifinality
(a condition in which different initial conditions lead to similar effects), without
addressing the actual dilemmas. The important skill is to bring the dilemmas, the
conflicts, out into the open and discuss about them. A good facilitator puts sufficient
time into divergence before aiming for convergence. In fact, it may not be possible to
converge and it may be necessary for all to accept a hard-won compromise. But that
openness and responsiveness require a great deal of social trust, something that for
example in Peru, as in many other locations elsewhere, is still developing. Thus, any
'repair' means a combination of conflict, negotiation and, where possible, consensus-
seeking. The effect of multi-stakeholder participation, then, is not to depoliticise
issues (quite the contrary), but to expand the legitimacy base beyond government,
beyond 'the experts'.
The 'cognitive school' of MSP, then, sees facilitated social learning as a
helpful modality enabling new forms of governance. Our research however encountered
serious problems with the cognitive approach.
Platforms can help a better spread of ideas (within the platform and inside-
out). Communication may be a vehicle for information/knowledge exchange,
knowledge building and dissemination. Free-riding, opportunism and double agendas
however are obvious pitfalls. While there are known cases where the stakeholders
themselves collect, manage and interpret the information, it is hard to predict and
prove however that any joint learning (rather than individual learning, or learning at
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delegation level) happens as a result of participation. While no doubt people learn by
doing, i.e. acquire new information and ways of thinking due to their participation,
we find that the ´social´, mutual, collaborative aspect, is not necessarily happening.
The critical condition here is not only the recognition of interdependence, but also
the willingness of all that involves taking joint responsibility and learning their way
into addressing the issue facing all. Negotiation that looked integrative may turn out
to be distributive after all. For example, in the Nete basin (Flanders), where the
Ministry for the Environment selected and invited 13 stakeholder categories to help
develop a river vision, we found several actors listening in, but not really contributing.
Some actors subscribed to the participation process as such, but also worked around
the platform, for example mobilising the press.
MSP: no cure-all
Clearly, MSPs are not suited to all types of problems and all kinds of
policy contexts. While explicitly starting from diversity, MSPs tend to 'homogenise'
the problem, looking for consensual solutions by providing a conducive space for mutual
understanding. Where conflicts are totally antagonistic (see Table below), there is
little hope for such a collaborative process. Likewise, in a habitat where diversity and
debate are frowned upon, MSPs are unlikely to work. Legal, political or bureaucratic
concerns can limit the space for utilising the result from negotiation and, where
applicable, lessons learned. (LEEWIS & van den BAN, 2003). MSPs, then, are a
recommended practice where the field is not dominated by a single actor and there is
a basic willingness (eagerness) to communicate.
Much of the MSP literature is inspired by Habermas' (1984) ideas on
communicative rationality, in which to strive for 'authentic speech situations' where
everybody will speak their minds regardless of politics and institutions. The expectation
is that through dialogue, perceptions and problem definitions will change and converge
(PONCELET, 1998). An aversion to (party) politics and conflict informs this particular
literature. For many, the lack of harmony, incompatibility and struggle inherent in
politics and conflict continues to have a negative connotation. However, our research
finds that MSPs tend to be also political and often conflictive in nature, both within
the platform itself and between the platform and its broader environment, resulting
from a diversity of needs, interests, perceptions and cultures in the dealing with water
resources. Such diversity should not necessarily result in a violent confrontation, and
therefore not necessarily be experienced as negative.
The Habermasian belief in communication as a means to overcome the
limitations of institutions and political processes certainly has contributed to skepticism
about MSPs - not everybody is a believer. In fairness, however, this school of thought
has never claimed that stakeholder dialogues themselves will solve deep-rooted
conflicts. Multi-stakeholder processes are not going to work where oppositions are
fundamental. It is just not the right policy instrument for it.
Certain criteria need to be fulfilled to justify considering MSP processes
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at all - there have to be conflicting interests, the stakeholders have to feel
interdependent and there have to be opportunities for constructive communication
between the stakeholders (AARTS & van WOERKUM, 2000). The nature of a problem
should be structured such that consensus on norms, values and goals as well as desired
knowledge is feasible (Table 1).
No consensus on norms, values Consensus on norms, values &
& goals goal
No consensus on required knowledge Unstructured, wicked problem Moderately structured problem
/management options
Consensus on required knowledge/ Ill-structured problem Structured problem
management options
Fig.1 Types of problems
If these preconditions are unlikely to be met via multi-stakeholder
platforms, other negotiation and learning strategies or even confrontation, or deferring
the problem may be more successful. In that sense, pace Röling, dialogue is not our
only hope.
4. POWER SHARING?
The majority of platforms do not come together spontaneously. There
may be a charismatic leader with good political access setting things in motion, but
more usually there is an external facilitator (or facilitating organisation) who convenes
and motivates the platform. A government agency (Ministry of Environment) or hired
consultancy may be the facilitator when the state initiates the process, while in bottom-
up processes, an NGO (WWF) or university will usually be the leader. The platforms
supported by international governmental institutions such as IWMI, IDRC and EU
may also be categorised into the latter group where the platform initiatives intend to
empower local groups. Still, the distinction between bottom-up and top-down makes
little practical sense in terms of results, since in all of the externally facilitated cases,
a general dependency on the external facilitator is encountered for the continuation
of the platform.
While we encountered 'bottom-up' platforms initiated by NGOs in Peru
and South Africa, and private (water) companies in the UK now are experimenting
with consumer fora, more often the initiator of a water forum is the public sector. As
Bruns (2003) notes, a 'ladder of participation' - a popular tool to grade the level of
public participation - in fact indicates the degrees to which governments share and
delegate power to non-public actors.
Governments can be quite schizophrenic with respect to delegation of
powers. On the one hand, they have gone a long way to privatise water services and
decentralise management and operation, on the other hand, states prove conspicuously
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unwilling to forego significant control. Apart from their Weberian monopoly on the
means of violence, governments have certain exclusive resources at their disposal
such as sizeable budgets and personnel, special powers, access to the mass media and
democratic legitimation. Access to these resources generally means that governments
have considerable power in particular to define the strategic space of any other actor.
For all the sea changes in public management in response to state overload and policy
failures - the New Public Management, network management - states are not going to
relinquish much of their power primacy. Moreover, new infra-structural projects have
large sunk costs, so that allowing a process that may have the outcome the planners
envisaged means a major project risk. Governments may therefore ´sit on´ river basin
information, as did the Wallonian authorities (Verhallen, pers. comm.), or otherwise,
intentionally or unintentionally, frustrate the process by burdening stakeholders with
heaps of technical information. In the Altotieté basin, Nagy de Oliveira Campos (2004)
found stakeholders had to tenaciously wade through a pile of inscrutable reports to
retrieve the river data they needed.
Delegation should not be confused with offloading operational
responsibilities. The Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), for example, is
now very happy to devolve responsibility for the operation and maintenance of neglected,
at times decrepit flood management, irrigation and drainage infrastructure onto users
themselves, who by taking charge of operation and maintenance are expected to
develop a sense of ownership. However, the latter have no choice in the matter, or on
the budget, which makes the transfer deeply unpopular.
In practice, we find a lack of mandate in all multi-stakeholder processes
we have observed in the MSP-ICM project. Most participatory processes remain at the
information and consultation stages, which in view of the much-used Arnstein's ladder
rates as 'phony participation'. 'Meaningful participation' would require devolving
mandates down to the lowest practicable level and giving people the right to say 'no'
to interventions that make perfect sense technically, economically and environmentally.
Is the lack of meaningful mandate a problem? This is a relevant concern,
since most multi-stakeholder platforms we encountered can be said to have been
conceived as a sounding board rather than a policy-making body. They are like think
tanks or focus groups (Type 2, below), providing policymakers with ideas and feedback
from selected social groups. We found that the fact that MSPs do not generally share
power to any significant degree in itself does not have to be a major problem while the
participants are aware of the limited extent of their say. It appears many stakeholder
groups do not necessarily wish to take responsibility of co-management of the resource,
which they see primarily as a public task. They do however want to be heard and not
left out of the process, and, as in the case of the Nete, are annoyed if they missed out
on key information. In this sense, the arrangement can bring enough benefits to both
initiators and consultants.
How much power is actually gained by platforms? This section presents a
typology of multi-stakeholder processes according to their degree of influence. Largely
based on such PhD and MSP research as was feasible in the course of the MSP-ICM
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project, it is by no means representative of the global MSP scene  - although it may be
indicative as a heuristic.
TYPE 1 - Social network
Multi-stakeholder processes do not necessarily solve problems, but they
do help disputing parties to partly understand other stakeholders' views and interests.
Those involved stress time and again the crucial importance of the process itself as a
communication and visioning process, especially in low-trust societies such as post-
violence, post-dictatorship, post-apartheid societies.
 Although they may not solve conflict and problems, MSP can make life
better, even as social events. Several Kat and Mtata  'rivrer forum twinning events'
were co-organised by our project  together with Rhodes University to stimulate mutual
learning about the different experiences of a 'top-down' and a 'bottom-up' platform
but also worked especially well as a social gathering where story-telling, discussion
and singing and dancing alternated (SIMPUNGWE, 2003 on www.dow.wau.nl/msp).
Rather than actual platforms, which suggests physically fixed space with
an organisational structure and secretariat, Multi-Stakeholder Platforms may in fact
primarily be networks. In a network problem-solving capacity is dispersed (Glasbergen
1995). Platforms and networks are both metaphors. While platforms suggest a form of
institutionalisation, network management (KICKERT, 1993) suggests shifting alliances,
not necessarily tied to one place.
  The 'Yakunchik' MSP in Ayacucho, Peru (ORÉ, 2004), for example, is
currently more like a 'phone circle', a group of people who are in touch with each
other but do not actually have a secretariat and an office at their disposal. Even if they
now have little concrete action to show for, interviewees claim they greatly value the
fact that the multi-stakeholder network exists at all.
TYPE  2 -  Focus group
This is the type of MSP we encountered most frequently in the research
project. MSP processes are especially found in planning and visioning processes,
convoked by the government, where plans for the future may be at a less detailed
stage, with a discrete number of sessions.
 This participation process is extractive in the sense that at relatively low
investment, the government has access to a socially embedded advisory body, where it
can learn about the range of interests and positions involved, and what policy aspects
are likely to generate fierce opposition. Stakeholders themselves get to hear first about
new policies and can request more specific information or amenities.
The NGO-initiated processes are set up intending to bring about important
changes, and in places they manage to make important changes. However, we see
little empowerment and delegation of power taking place even in these cases.
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TYPE 3 -  Service organisation
An MSP may seek to take advantage of the breadth of the network to
generate external support, catering to a collective need. The dialogue on the Sabarmati
basin in Gujarat, India (KUMAR et al. 1999) developed from the different relationships
of agricultural and industrial stakeholder groups had with a facilitating NGO, VIKSAT.
Joining these networks, this platform managed to find funds for, among others, water
conservation facilities such as roof cisterns. The groups involved sometimes meet in a
plenary, but more often bilaterally to work out shared issues or present a proposal for
technical assistance. The Sabarmati MSP was supported by Canadian (IDRC) aid.
Now that this programme has run out, the challenge is to keep the platform going.
TYPE 4 - Crisis management organisation
Devolving power to lower-level actors is hard enough for states delegating
power to trans- and international actors proves out to be even harder. Sovereignty is
sacrosanct both with respect to societal actors and other nations. Even commissions
regulating international rivers shared by friendly states often co-operate as little as
possible. In this context, the space for stakeholder involvement in trans-boundary
stakeholder platforms seems an uphill battle. However, on special occasions a multi-
stakeholder dialogue can be resorted to as a 'Track Two´ activity, and in so doing
develop considerable momentum, tackling issues where normal negotiations fail. The
Zwin Commission, a multi-stakeholder body comprising Dutch and Belgian
governmental and non-governmental actors to manage an area of great natural beauty,
is emblematic - like a may fly , which shows only once a year in spectacular swarms, it
only showed in exceptional political weather conditions during its 70 year existence
(SANTBERGEN, pers. comm.).
When the platform is used especially for occasional dispute settlement or
negotiation processes, it can be expected to lie dormant for a long time and occasionally
spring to life. Other trans-boundary MSPs similarly seem to be there to solve incidents
and crises, not for permanent water management. National autonomies still prevail in
day-to-day water management.
In Tiquipaya, Bolivia, an 'intervention MSP' was established to mediate
between urban and rural users, suppliers and government actor over a controversial
sanitation project which had led to violence and the resignation of the mayor (FAYSSE
et al, 2005). Post-disaster co-ordination platforms as in Ica, Perú (Oré, 2004) can
similarly be headed under this rubric
TYPE 5 -  Action Alliance
A different, more radical type of multi-stakeholder alliance is found in
response to unpopular interventions or policies. Here, negotiation is a possible outcome
of an anti-intervention drive.
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In India, non-violent resistance movements to the dams in the Narmada
valley, Gujarat and Southern Maharashtra, and citizen initiatives on the Chalakudy
River took place. In the dispute over the Tar Ohl dam, which the Maharashtra state
government was pressed to build quickly, a social movement composed of low-case
landless and smallholders, backed by progressive industrial leaders, organised mass
sit-ins to coax the Maharashtra state government into a more co-operative response
to civil protest - more co-operative, that is, than the initial ham-fisted police
intervention. Interestingly, the alliance involved both groups that stood to gain from a
new dam and those who stood to lose form resettlement. In so doing, the platform
managed to co-opt rather than alienate the government, bringing social pressure to
bear to negotiating amenities for resettled evacuees.
In each of those cases, the resource issue is the focus of much wider
social struggles. Here, a multi- sectorial network forms to join forces against a common
touchstone, initiated by government.
TYPE 6  - River Basin Organisation
The catchment level is emerging as the 'natural' unit for water management
in Europe and elsewhere. Water resource management has long been a top-down
concern of many states, and water authorities followed administrative boundaries.
River basins criss-cross administrative boundaries, and now that hydrology rather than
territorial administrative or cultural boundaries dictate the management scale, states
are forced to work together.
Public participation in the management of river basin areas is explicitly
stipulated in Article 14 of the European Water Framework Directive (EWFD;
EUROPEAN UNION, 2000), which states that the general public should not only be
informed, but also consulted in the formulation of management plans. However, there
are indications that the understanding of participation in the Directive accepts public
involvement being scaled back to consultation and information provision (type 2).
Like the EWFD, the Brazilian watershed-based water management model
can be said to be fashioned after the French model (Agences de l'Eau), which allocates
seats to key stakeholder groups at catchment level. The Brazilian water law gives
great scope for participation - but taking that space is another matter while the playing
field is far from level. In the Paraíba do Sul catchment, Mostertman (2005) found that
it tends to be mainly the institutional stakeholders who exert influence on the process
- quite similar to the French experience. While some basin committees give the
impression of a sleepwalking existence, others, such as the Comitês das Bacias
Hidrográficas dos Rios Piracicaba, Capivari e Jundiaí (www.comitepcj.sp.gov.br), are
quite decisive. Still, the Brazilian experience is a recent and developing one, and a
number of active NGOs and universities may well succeed in increasing the space for
less powerful actors.
Multi-stakeholder platforms: integrating society in water resourse management?  – JEROEN WARNER
1 5
5. WHAT IF STAKEHOLDERS DO NOT PARTICIPATE?
A stake in water is, in itself, a pleonasm - at root, everyone has a stake in
water, as no one can hope to live very long without any water intake. The new, post-
Apartheid South African water law of 1998 therefore invites all to participate in decision-
making over water resource management. Noble as this sounds, it is pretty much
impracticable. Clearly, not everybody is going to participate in the all-inclusive agora
democracy of the ancient Greek city-states - where, upon closer scrutiny, slaves, women
and those without possession did not have the vote anyway. In modern days, convening
stakeholders on a regular basis similarly involves the issue of selectivity, if on the basis of
different criteria. An MSP is a controlled space in which specific topics are discussed
with specific people. In practice, the stakeholders are not often self-selecting and
self-motivated, they are often invited to participate by external facilitators or present
themselves as an organised interest group. This gives considerable discretion to
facilitators, who can design a 'box' defining who will discuss and how the problem is
defined. If these facilitators are not totally scrupulous about stakeholder selection,
this necessarily puts potentially interested, but unorganised parties at a disadvantage.
Only by organising themselves and making a noise they can hope to be admitted in a
second run. When we look for stakeholders, we should therefore expect selectively in
and (self-) excluded groups. It is not just the MSP facilitator or board who decides
who is in and out.
The assumption that opening a space for participation will mean
enthusiastic involvement of stakeholders turns out to be invalid. A prevalent mistake
concerns under- or overestimating people's abilities and a priori motivation to participate
(WARNER & MOREYRA, 2004; also see COOKE & KOTHARI 2001). Where
salience is obvious, as in dike maintenance in Holland in the Middle Ages, everyone's
involvement is called for. But in creeping catastrophes such as drought or pollution,
many may not be convinced of a platforms' direct 'relevance' to their needs.
It is important to understand that groups may well exclude themselves from
the process, as they feel the benefits from participating do not justify the (opportunity)
costs. It emerges from our case studies that not everyone wants to be integrated. The
scale can be an impediment from making it interesting. In this sense, integration and
participation seem to pull in opposite directions  - people are motivated to participate
in a clear, single-issue, close-to-the-bone area, while integrated management, because
of the complexity of all the interrelationships, seems to invite centralisation. An example
is the Altotieté watershed committee in the metropolitan region of Sao Paulo, which
seeks to decentralise water management to bring it closer to the citizens. In this sense
it is one of the very few truly metropolitan platforms in Brazil. But as Jacobi (2004)
notes, this downscaling inevitably brings about fragmentation where an integrated
metropolitan policy would be called for to combat the severe environmental problems
the watershed is faced with.
If there are few wins to be had (Yakunchik platform, Perú) or project
money runs out (Sabarmati platform, India), the platform is moribund. People are not
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apathetic, as has often been assumed in the past, but they can be frustrated into
thinking that nothing ever changes even if they put time and effort into participation.
Participation involves important economic and political opportunity costs to stakeholder
groups, which may outweigh the benefits of co-operation. Actors may therefore think
twice about joining the decision-making process. Especially where integration seems
a euphemism for assimilation or co-optation, MSPs may not be popular with intended
actor groups. They run the risk of being co-opted to the extent that they (are seen to
have) become part of the technocratic elite, thus losing their legitimacy with a
constituency that expects them to rally support against issues. We should therefore
keep an eye out for the non-represented, both powerful and powerless groups. Do they
really ignore the MSP? Do they interact informally with actors, or go around the
platform to access those in power to get what they want? It may be more advantageous
for some groups to wait on the sidelines until things get more interesting, or to drop
out and work around the MSP, mobilising a constituency outside it.
As a form of communicative governance - learning together - MSPs can
indeed increase understanding and acceptance of new ideas and policies, intending
to change people's minds about a controversial issue -  'participation' seems the magic
word that will 'create' a support base for acceptance of new policies. After all,
'Effectiveness = Quality times Acceptance' is a rule of thumb in management literature
(e.g. see www.gehealthcare.com/euen/services/performance-solutions/
methodology.html). An example of an attempt to 'create a support base' for changes
and interventions such as water pricing and new infrastructure is the Paraiba do Sul
river basin committee (MOSTERTMAN, 2005). That the take-up of the process was
moderate should not be surprising. Communication experts (such as AARTS & van
WOERKUM, 2000) remind us that you cannot change people's attitudes and behaviour
if they are fundamentally unhappy with the policy. You cannot 'sell' an unpopular plan
unless there is something in it for everyone. If the starting point of the intervention or
institutional change cannot be subject to discussion, strong opponents will question
the legitimacy of the process itself (I call this 'second-order conflict', in contrast with
'first-order' conflict over the allocation of the water resource itself).
Such observations should not be taken to imply that skeptical groups will
not become active at all. Groups may feel that participating in platforms robs them of
leverage. Once galvanised, radical environmental or identity groups can be expected
not to participate so as to have their 'hands free' in staging extra-parliamentary protests
outside the platform, or less visible ways of putting pressure on decision-makers. Such
counter-hegemonic participation may not be what MSP initiators had in mind, but
participation in a sociological sense it certainly is - as Norman Long (2001) has shown,
participation is any action knowledgeable social actors undertake to alter their
conditions of living, whether or not it fits the 'box' designed by initiators of participatory
platforms. We have also come across groups that 'have their cake and eat it', that is,
operating both inside and outside the participatory process.
Others bide their time and wait for the right moment to enter the fray.
We found two cases in which farmers belatedly demanded a seat around the table
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when they became aware of the platform. In the Scheldt estuary, Flemish farmer
organisations gained a seat on the estuary platform later in the process and seemed to
benefit from 'preferential treatment' from other participants to get them up to speed
with proceedings (VERHALLEN, pers. comm. 2005). In Perú, the well-organised
farmer's union JUDRA gained observer status in the 'Yakunchik' platform in Ayacucho
in 2002, sparking off a debate whether they should be incorporated in the platform or,
conversely, whether the platform should be incorporated in their well-oiled lobby (ORÉ,
2004).
6. RESULTS NEEDED
Currently, deliberation is enthusiastically embraced in the water world.
But is anyone listening? MSPs are a 'beast' to which almost mystical powers tend to be
attributed, often appearing in policy tales, but as yet rarely spotted in broad daylight.
Without a mandate, there is no obligation to do anything with the outcome of all the
talk. Without an audience, MSPs are dialogues of the deaf. The Dialogue on Water,
Food and Environment seems to have imploded, in part due to a sudden Dutch
governmental decision to decimate funding. If that trend continues, MSPs as a new
institutional species will join the ranks of the red herring, the paper tiger and the
white elephant.
In that context, one the first amendments the MSP-ICM research team
made to the working definition of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms was to include an
action component, to avoid the danger of MSP turning into a talking shop. Management
texts on innovation, such as Hamel (2000), suggest you need quick wins to carry the
revolution though. For their participants not to lose interest, MSPs need to be clear
about their goals and produce 'food on the table'. The saying can be taken quite
literally for the poor - 'for the hungry man, the beauty of the beast is in the pot'
(quoted in BINDRABAN, 2004).
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NOTE
1.   A useful survey of the rise of international conventions supporting multistakeholder processes, which can be





INTEGRATING SOCIETY IN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT?
Abstract
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms are a currently popular concept in the
international water world. It is however not a very well defined phenomenon. The
present article unpacks the concept, proposes to see platforms as networks, and
identifies two ´schools of thought´: social learning and negotiation. It attempts a
preliminary typology of platforms encountered in real life, in which the Comités de
Bacia in Brazil, for all their shortcomings, come out as a relatively influential type. In
closing, the article then identifies reasons for non-participation, suggesting that it is
an inevitable corollary of organised participation.
Keywords: multi-stakeholder platforms; integrated water resource
management; participation; non-participation.
ARENAS DE STAKEHOLDERS MÚLTIPLOS: INTEGRANDO A
SOCIEDADE NA GESTÃO DOS RECURSOS HÍDRICOS?
Resumo
Arena de stakeholders múltiplos é um conceito estabelecido na área de
recursos hídricos internacional. Contudo, é um fenômeno pouco definido. O presente
artigo destrincha o conceito, propondo conceber as arenas como redes, e identifica
duas “escolas de pensamento”: aprendizagem social e negociação. O texto procura por
uma tipologia preliminar das arenas identificadas na vida real, nas quais os Comitês
de Bacias no Brasil, por todas suas peculiaridades, aparecem como um tipo significativo.
Ao final, o artigo identifica as razões que explicam a não participação, sugerindo que
esse é um corolário inevitável da participação organizada.
Palavras-chave: Arenas de stakeholders múltiplos; gestão integrada dos
recursos hídricos; participação; não participação.
